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China has been delaying its adoption of a flexible exchange rate system with free capital flows. The main 
excuse is that its financial sector is still in its fragile stage and is not able to withstand any external shocks. 
A big bang approach towards such liberalization will only lead to financial crisis as observed by 
experiences of many Asia-Pacific countries during the Asian Financial Crisis. With this in mind, this paper 
attempts to uncover the approach and strategies adopted by China in its banking reform since 1978 and then 
assess these reform measures in macroeconomic perspective. The paper argues that since China is still 
lingering on export-oriented strategy in promoting economic growth and monetary independence for 
demand management is still a long way to go, it is still in China’s best interest not to adopt a flexible 
exchange rate system at this point of time. As to capital account liberalization, the main focus is to engineer 
a controlled and systematic capital outflows through outward investment in particular portfolio investment. 
At the micro level, China should continue its banking reforms until the financial sector is strong enough to 
withstand the severe pressure of globalization. By then, will China, with its matured financial system be 
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Banking Reform in China: 
An Assessment in Macroeconomic Perspective 
 





Banking reform in China had started three decades ago in 1978. However, the 
deepening of the reform gained momentum only after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 
as China is determined not to repeat the same mistakes committed by its Asian 
neighbours. With the accession to WTO in 2001, China further committed itself to 
opening up its services sector for global competition. After much effort made since 1998, 
China’s banking sector looks much better with improvements in terms of capital 
adequacy, asset quality, financial liberalization and ownership structure. However, there 
are still many challenges ahead. Corporate governance in the financial sector needs to be 
strengthened further. Acceleration in consolidation in the banking sector through mergers 
and acquisitions may be needed so that the sector can withstand severe competition on a 
global scale. Such consolidation will provide synergy in bringing about competitive 
forces among banks. Of no less importance is the entry of foreign banks in the Chinese 
banking scene and such entry will have a long term impact on the Chinese banking 
industry in terms of scale and scope of banking business, globalization of banking 
operations and universalization of banking. 
 
This paper attempts to uncover the approach and strategies adopted by China in 
its banking reform since 1978 and then assess these reform measures taking into 
consideration of its macroeconomic implications. Such macroeconomic perspective will 
help to explain at the current economic conditions the inappropriateness of adopting a 
flexible exchange rate with free capital flows. 
 
The paper is divided into four sections. After the Introduction, the second section 
outlines the historical evolution of the banking reform since 1978 to provide a historical   2
background and perspective on the banking reform in China. The section also attempts to 
distinguish and chart the major trends of the reform, with the purpose of identifying the 
overall approach and policy strategies adopted in the banking reforms over the last three 
decades. The assessment of these approach and strategies is followed in the fourth section. 
The assessment also covers, among others, macroeconomic implications of the banking 
reform, especially in the macroeconomic policy framework. In conclusion, the paper 
argues that since China is still lingering on the export-oriented strategy in promoting 
economic growth and monetary independence for effective demand management is still a 
long way to go, it is still not in China’s best interest to adopt a flexible exchange rate 
system with free flow of capital at this point of time. 
 
 
2.  Historical Evolution, Policy Approach and Implementation Strategy 
 
Before the banking reform, China’s financial sector encountered a number of intricate 
problems. Of these problems, the most prominent ones were as follows (Garcia-Herrero 
and others, 2005): 
 
•  Unbalanced financial sector; 
•  Fragmented financial market; 
•  Dominated by state-owned banks; 
•  Peculiar structure of balance sheet: (1) Loans are large part of assets; (2) Almost 
all liabilities are deposits; 
•  Poor asset quality- high non-performance loans; 
•  Low capitalization; 
•  Weak corporate governance 
 
With the introduction of the banking reform, all these problems were expected to fade 
away with the establishment of a modern banking system with effective governance 
infrastructure. 
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2.1  Historical Evolution of Banking Reform 
 
Prior to the “Open Door Policy” adopted in 1978, China was under the so-called a 
mono-bank system. Under the system, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) was the main 
national bank, providing both the central banking commercial banking functions
2   in 
accordance to the State Plan. The Bank of China was established in 1949 under the 
umbrella of PBOC to provide foreign exchange services while the Agricultural Bank of 
China (ABC) which was also a part of PBOC under its Bureau of Rural Financial 
Management was set up in 1951 to provide financing in the agricultural sector.  
 
With the “Open Door Policy” in 1978, China began its financial sector reform by 
changing the institutional structure of a mono-bank system. According to Chiu and Lewis 
(2006), financial sector reform in China can be divided into five distinct phases, as 
follows: 
 
•  Phase 1 (1979-85): Breaking up of the mono-bank system by setting up a multi-
tier banking system through separating commercial banking functions from 
central banking functions; 
 
•  Phase 2 (1986-92): Setting up more financial institutions such as national and 
regional commercial banks, and the establishment of the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock markets in 1990 and 1991 respectively; 
 
•  Phase 3 (1993-97): Unify the dual exchange rate system; separate the apparatus of 
monetary from the fiscal side of the government; and the introduction of the 
Commercial Banking Act, 1995. Central banking functions were defined under 
the Act of PBOC. 
 
                                                 
2 Commercial banking function here refers to mobilization of deposits and provision of loans. It does not 
imply that the function is performed on a commercial basis.   4
•  Phase 4 (1998-2002): Attempts to resolve non-performing loans of banking 
institutions by forming asset management companies (AMC) and also by capital 
injections. 
 
•  Phase 5 (2003-2007): Separating regulatory function from central banking 
function by setting up the China Banking Regulator Commission (CBRC). 
Strengthening domestic financial institutions ahead of WTO accession 
commitments in 2006. Capital account liberalization through Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors (QFII) and Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors 
(QDII) schemes. 
 
On the regulatory framework, there is a policy change, separating central banking 
policy making from regulatory functions. In April 2003, the regulatory and supervisory 
functions of PBOC were transferred to the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC) (See Figure 1). PBOC is now entrusted mainly with implementation of monetary 
policy and exchange rate policy. PBOC also continue to regulate and supervise financial 
markets to ensure efficient allocation of resources and financial stability. Other regulatory 
institutions such as the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) and the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission (CIRC) were also established to regulate different sectors of the finance 
industry.  
 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
 
In January 2007, China convened its third National Financial Working Conference 
which laid out a medium-term policy direction for banking and financial reform (Hang 
Seng Bank, Feb/Mar 2007). The conference identified five key areas of future reform in 
the near term future, as follows: 
 
•  Deepen the reform of state-owned banks including restructuring the Agricultural 
Bank of China (ABC);   5
•  Further development of the capital and insurance markets; 
•  Start reforming policy banks and allowing the China Development Bank (CDB) 
to operate commercially; 
•  Expand investment channels for foreign exchange reserves; and 
•  Improve the rural banking system 
 
 
2.2  Policy Approach and Implementation Strategy 
 
The overall approach and strategy of the banking reform is China can be aptly 
described by an aphorism, “crossing the river by feeling for the stones.” (摸着石头过河) 
This is in line with the general gradual approach towards economic reforms since 1978. 
The initial banking reform involved with the breaking up of the mono-banking system 
and the establishment of new financial institutions. Only after 1998, did China began to 
address the issue of non-performing loans and capital adequacy. Despite the rapid 
economic growth over the same period, the banking reforms was slow by comparison due 
to its intricacy and intertwined with state-own enterprises and government finance. The 
problems have been dubbed by Dean (2001) as the ‘Asian Governance Triangle’ or 
‘Triangle of Woes’.  
 
To resolved such thorny problems, China has to be very focus and systematic in 
its banking reform. The strategies adopted are to focus on restructuring of large banking 
institutions; to let small and medium banks have their own organic growth; and to have 
simultaneous reforms of state-owned enterprises and the banking sector to resolve the 
long outstanding NPLs arising from the ‘Triangle of Woes’
3. At the same time, China 
also applies external pressure so as to force domestic financial institutions to reform 
through global competition. The accession to WTO in 2001 and the subsequent 
commitments to opening up to foreign participation by December 2006 show China’s 
political determination to develop a matured and modern financial system. 
 
                                                 
3 For detailed discussion on this please refer to Ng and Thorud (2007).   6
2.2.1  Bank Restructuring and Regulations 
 
Early reform measures concentrated on the shake-up of the mono-banking system 
dominated by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC). The shake-up led to the rapid 
development of a multi-tier banking system with four state-owned banks, namely the 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Bank of China (BOC), People’s Construction Bank 
of China (later the China Construction Bank, CCB) and Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China (ICBC). The multi-tier system became more complete with the formation of 
new national and regional commercial banks. The new national commercial banks 
included the Bank of Communication (1986), CITIC Industrial Bank (1987), Huaxia 
Bank (1992), and Everbright Bank (1992). The first private bank, Minsheng Bank, which 
was set up in 1996 also joined the group of national commercial banks. Meanwhile, 
several regional banks were also set up in response to the rapid development in the 
coastal provinces. Such regional banks include Xingye Bank of Fujian Province (1981), 
Huiting Urban Cooperative Bank (Sichuan Province, 1985), Zhao Shang Bank in 
Shenzhen (1986), Development Bank fo Shenzhen City (1987) and Development Bank of 
Guangdong Province (1988). In 1994, the policy lending functions of PBOC and four 
state-owned banks (the Big Fours) were taken over by three newly created policy banks, 
i.e. the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB), the State Development Bank (SDB) and 
Import-Export Bank (IEB). 
 
The most drastic reform were the bank restructuring measures undertaken during 
the period 1998-2005. With the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, there was a 
pressing need to address the long outstanding issues of poor asset qualities and low 
capitalization of the banking system. In line with the reform strategy of ‘grasp the large 
and release the small,’ the policy strategy was to focus on the restructuring of the four big 
state-owned banks, namely the Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, China 
Construction Bank and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. The purpose is to 
introduce reform and yet still retain state ownership and control in large banking 
institutions with national importance (Brean, 2007). 
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Before the major bank restructuring, PBOC took unprecedented move in 
November 1998 in branch restructuring along the line of the US Federal Reserve System. 
Prior to the restructuring, the branch network covered a network of major branches in 27 
provinces and four autonomous regions. After the restructuring, there were nine supra-
regional offices cutting across provinces with direct control from the head office in 
Beijing. This is to prevent central bank branches from subjecting to provincial 
governments’ pressure to extend excessive bank credit to finance local projects (Chiu and 
Lewis, 2006). Along with this restructuring, the government abandoned the long-standing 
credit quota system for state-owned banks. A new loan classification system in line with 
international standards was introduced in March 1998.  
 
To meet the capital adequacy target and also to resolve the long-standing NPLs, 
official financial support since 1998 was estimated to be about US$400 billion (Chu and 
others, 2006) or 18% of 2005 GDP. Of this amount, US$95 billion was mainly used for 
recapitalization of the big four state-owned banks while the rest (US$305 billion) was 
used to dispose of NPLs from the big four state-owned banks, China Development Bank 
and Bank of Communications (BOCOM) (See Table 1). 
 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
To dispose NPL over-hang of the earlier era, four asset management corporations 
(AMCs) were set up in 1999 to purchase NPLs from the big four state-owned banks. The 
AMCs are as follows: Cinda, Great Wall, Huarong and Orient. Originally, each AMC 
was paired with a single state bank - Cinda with CCB, Great Wall with ABC, Orient for 
BOC and Huarong for ICBC respectively. Subsequently, the AMCs were allowed to 
purchase NPL packages from any of the four banks. The immediate mandate of AMCs is 
to recover US$121 billion of NPLs of these banks, arising from excessive borrowings 
from loss-making state-owned enterprises. The longer aim of the AMCs is to rehabilitate 
the loss-making state-owned enterprises and eventually liquidate their stakes by selling or 
listing the shares in the stock exchanges. Their main activity is debt-equity swaps that are   8
selected by the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC). As at March 2005, NPLs 
amounting to US$168.5 billion has been transferred to AMCs (see Table 2). 
 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 
Previously, bank regulation and supervision was directly under PBOC as part of 
its central banking functions. After April 2003, China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC) took over the functions. CBRC introduced a number of improvements in bank 
regulations (Garcia-Herrero, A and others, 2005).  For instance, the five-tier loan 
classification system was further enhanced with a deadline by end of 2005. The 8% target 
of capital adequacy ratio as prescribed by the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) 
was introduced and all banks were expected to be complied by 2007. A risk-based 
supervision based on CAMELS
4 criteria will be applied to joint-stock commercial banks. 
In addition, related party lending is strictly prohibited. CBRC also set out seven 
performance indicators for BOC and CCB to benchmark with the top 100 largest banks in 
the world (Brean, 2007). 
 
2.2.2 Financial  Liberalization 
 
Financial liberalization is also an essential part of the banking reform in China. There 
are four areas of financial liberalization, as follows: 
 
•  Ownership restructuring 
•  Interest rate liberalization 
•  Opening up to foreign competition (WTO and foreign bank entry) 
•  Capital account liberalization (QDII and QFII) 
                                                 
4 The acronym CAMELS refers to the six components of bank’s financial conditions that are assessed: 
capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity and sensitivity to market risk. It is a rating 
system used by regulatory and supervisory authorities to evaluate the safety and soundness of financial 




Studies have shown that state-ownership of banks will not lead to efficiency 
(Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2005). Privatization has been rejected as an option for 
ownership restructuring. The option undertaken by China is mainly through 
corporatization, i.e. through public listing of its shares in the local or foreign stock 
exchange. The other option is to increase the stake of foreign strategic investors or both. 
Public listing through the issue of IPO in the stock exchanges, in particular the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) is aimed at exerting pressure on domestic banks to 
comply with corporate governance imposed by these exchanges. This will ensure public 
confidence, especially among the strategic investors. The introduction of strategic 
investors as minority shareholders will ensure that the big fours are still in the hands of 
China’s national government. Secondly, the strategic investors can help restructure the 
banks internally with their vast experience in management skills, risk management, 
product development and access to international financial market. Table 3 shows a list of 
Chinese banks and their respective strategic investors with their shares of equity 
investment. 
 
<Insert Table 3> 
 
Four banks’ ownership structure has been restructured through the issue of IPOs in 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and also through increase in foreign stakes, as follows: 
 
•  CCB issued IPOs on HKSE in 2005, raising US$8 billion in share capital. Its 
strategic investor is Bank of America with 9% stake. 
 
•  BOCOM issued IPOs on HKSE in 2005. HSBC acquired 2.6% of its stake. 
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•  BOC issued US$9.7 billion IPO on HKSE. Minority stakes were acquired by 
Royal Bank of Scotland, Merill Lynch, Temasek Holdings of Singapore and Li 
Ka-shing group 
 
•  ICBC Issued US$14 billion IPO in HKSE. Its strategic investor is Goldman 
Sachs-led consortium. 
 
Interest rate liberalization 
 
Apart from ownership restructuring, interest rate liberalization was introduced as far 
back as 1996. However, the approach towards liberalization has been gradual and step by 
step, as follows: 
 
•  In 1996, interest rate liberalization was first introduced in inter-bank money 
market. Domestic loan interest rate corridor (band) was instituted. 
•  In 1997, interest rates in the bond repo market were set free. 
•  In 1998, Government bonds’ issuing rate was market determined. 
•  In 2000, controls over foreign currency lending rates and large-value foreign 
currency deposit rates were removed. 
•  In 2004, domestic loan interest rate corridor (band) except credit cooperatives was 
lifted. The lower limit on interest rates of deposits was lifted. 
 
 
Opening up to foreign competition (WTO and foreign entry) 
 
Foreign banks were initially restricted to conduct banking business only in a few 
cities in China. These banks were only allowed to provide foreign currency transactions 
to foreign companies operating there (Ferri, 2005). Only from April 2002 onwards, a 
number of foreign banks were specifically allowed to offer foreign currency transactions 
to Chinese nationals and firms. Further liberalization measures were adopted since 
December 2003, with the government’s permission to foreign banks to provide banking   11
services in reminbi or Chinese yuan (RMB) to Chinese firms in 13 cities. As at end of 
2005, 84 of the 191 foreign banks in China were given a license each to conduct RMB 
banking business. However, these banks’ local RMB business was restricted by their 
limited branching network and therefore access to cheap retail deposit funding. Moreover, 
they were also disadvantaged by the limits to inter-bank funding (Huang, 2002). 
 
In 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO with the commitment 
that, among others, China would remove all the geographic and business restrictions on 
foreign banks in China within five years. In short, all foreign banks are allowed to set up 
branches in all other cities in China, conduct RMB business, and provide retailing 
banking services to both local and foreign nationals alike (Lin, 2001). The main purpose 
of such a move is to use of external pressures, via foreign bank competition to force 
domestic banks to restructure their management to enhance their competitiveness.. 
 
In addition to the accession to WTO, China also introduced strategic investors in 
domestic bank ownership structure. Previously, acquisition of domestic bank stakes by 
foreign entities required approval from the State Council which was normally not easy to 
come by. In December 2003, China took a drastic turn by encouraging foreign banks to 
invest in domestic banks as strategic investors. Under the new rule, foreign banks as a 
group can own stakes of a domestic bank up to 25%. However, each investor is allowed 
to own up to 20%. The injection of strategic investors into the domestic bank ownership 
structure is expected to improve their corporate governance and inject management 
expertise and recapitalization funds. More specifically, the introduction of foreign 
strategic investors a handy tool for (1) bank restructuring; (2) enhancing banking skills 
through business co-operation, (3) supplementing equity capital, without recourse to 
fiscal budget allocation and (4) boosting status of Chinese banks through foreign 
affiliation (Hope and Hu, 2006; Lung and Fineman, July 2005). Moreover, the 
participation is compatible with the state’s overall control of the banks through provision 
of only minority stakes for foreign banks in the ownership structure.  
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Capital account liberalization (QDII and QFII) 
 
China is still under IMF Article VIII and allowed to have exchange control over 
capital and financial accounts. Under the exchange control, RMB is non-convertible for 
capital and financial account transactions without prior approval from the Chinese 
authorities. Prior to 2002, only foreign direct investments (FDI) were given permission to 
flow into China while portfolio investments and other short-term capital flows were 
totally prohibited under its exchange control. In December 2002, China enacted the 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) Act which allows foreign investors to 
invest Chinese securities, such as RMB denominated shares  and Treasuries listed on 
China’s stock exchanges or A-Shares; enterprise bonds, and other financial instruments 
as approved by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). For each investor, 
the amount invested can range from US$50 million to US$800 million effective from 
June 2003. Since then, a number of prominent foreign institutional investors such as 
Citigroup, HSBC, UBS, Nomura Securities, Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley, Goldman 
Sachs, JP Morgan have been given permission to invest in domestic capital market. The 
purpose of such policy measure is to attract foreign investors to invest in the China 
domestic securities. Since long-term investment is non-speculative, such capital inflow 
will not jeopardize China’s financial stability and at the same time act as a pressure for 
the securities market to improve its corporate governance.  
 
On 24 August 2006, CSRC, PBOC and SAFE jointly issued the “Measures for the 
Administration of Investment in Domestic Securities by Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investors” (the New QFII Rules) to supersede the original QFII introduced in 2002. The 
New QFII Rules became effective from 1
st September 2006. Under the new rules, priority 
is still given to “QFII applicants which manage closed-ended China funds, pension funds, 
insurance funds and other professionally managed funds” as in the original QFII scheme. 
However, qualifying criteria in terms of assets-under-management (AUM) for fund 
management institutions and insurance companies has been reduced from a minimum of 
US$10 billion to US$5 billion. The AUM for commercial banks and other securities 
firms still remain at US$10 billion each. The capital lock-up period under the new rules   13
has been made more flexible. Initially, the lock-up period was fixed at one to three years. 
Under the new rules, it is flexible (the period can be as low as three months) and can be 
adjusted by SAFE, depending on China’s economic and financial situation, foreign 
exchange movements, the balance of payments and policy arrangements of PBOC. Other 
operating difficulties were also removed. For instance, each fund manager was previously 
allowed to open just one account. With the new rules, they can open several sub-accounts 
to meet their operating needs. The QFII scheme has been operating since December 2002, 
but the investment quota under the scheme was only US$7.5 billion for 45 institutional 
investors as at end of December 2006. With the new rules, the quota is expected to 
increase to US$30 billion. 
 
In another effort to liberalize its capital account, China introduced the “Qualified 
Domestic Institutional Investors” (QDII) scheme on 13 April 2006. The investment quota 
permitted is USD10.8 billion. The scheme became effective from September 2006 
onwards. Basically, the scheme covers three sectors, as follows: 
 
(1) Qualified commercial banks are allowed to mobilize RMB funds from domestic 
institutions and individuals, and invest in overseas fixed income and money 
market instruments. 
(2) Qualified securities institutions are permitted to mobilize self-owned foreign 
exchange of domestic institutions and individuals (not purchase foreign exchange 
from the SAFE) and use the funds for overseas portfolio investment including 
buying shares and stocks. 
(3) For qualified insurance companies, they are allowed to invest domestic currency 
fund to invest overseas in fixed income and money market instruments under the 
current QDII. Previously, they could only use funds received in foreign currencies 
to invest in these instruments.  
 
Under the scheme, qualified investors are prohibited to invest in commodities, hedge 
funds or securities with a rating of less than BBB. 
   14
Effective from July 5, 2007, the new QDII quota increased from US$10.8 billion 
to US$14.2 billion. In addition, domestic brokers and fund mangers will also be allowed 
to invest clients’ fund in overseas fixed income, equity and derivative securities
5. Until 
then, only banks, securities firms and insurance companies were eligible for the QDII 
programme with various restrictions. However, these investments abroad are still 
restricted to Hong Kong financial market as Hong Kong is the only financial centre that 
has signed MOU with China for the scheme
6. It is expected that the scheme will be 
extended to cover investments in the major financial centres in the world to help drain 
excess liquidity away from China. As at March 2007, 30 financial institutions- 11 
domestic banks, seven foreign banks, 11 insurance companies and one mutual fund have 
been granted QDII status. 
 
 
3.  Assessment and Issues 
 
The overall reform approach and strategy can be, as noted by Brean (2007), aptly 
described by the following three aphorisms, namely: 
 
“Cross the river by feeling for the stones” - Deng Xiaoping 
 “Grasp the large and release the small”  
“It doesn’t matter whether the cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice.” -
Deng Xiaoping 
 
This is particular so for the banking reform. The reform approach has been of gradualism 
with no big bang style as one would have observed in the Russian case. It took slightly 
more than three decades in the banking reform to reach the current state. It is expected 
that China will take another decade or so before the financial sector to be a modern 
                                                 
5 Citi China launched structured notes product under QDII in May 2007. 
6 In May 2007, CBRC issued a circular to remove the prohibition on direct investment in 
equity and its structured products. It allows investment in stocks listed on a market 
regulated by a regulator having signed a MOU with CBRC for QDII products. Currently, 
only HK Securities and Futures Commission is a Recognized Regulator. 
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financial system well-integrated with the international financial system. Gradualism will 
continue to be the hallmark of the banking reform in China. This is because the financial 
sector with advances in computer and telecommunication technology has to be handled 
with care. Any faults or mistakes made along the way will cause widespread systemic 
effect on the Chinese economy and the world financial system. The lesson from the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997 has shown that through globalization, massive financial flows 
without proper governance in the international financial architecture can destroy a 
successful economy overnight. This is particularly so as China has already well 
integrated with the world economy through trade and investment. The aphorism by Mao 
Zedong that “waiting for ten thousand years to get things done is far too long, what we 
want is completion within a day” (一万年太久，只争朝夕.) should not be applied here. 
 
In terms of strategy, the approach of “grasp the large and release the small” (抓大
放小) is noticeable in the restructuring of the Big Fours. While the bank restructuring 
also occurs in other smaller banks, the focus is still on the Big Fours since 1998. The 
cleaning up of NPLs through AMCs, and capital injections into the three banks of the Big 
Fours have been going on for almost a decade. The next step is the restructuring of the 
Agricultural Bank of China in the next few years. The other small and medium banks 
have been left alone without major reform. It is expected that once the reform of the Big 
Fours is completed, the next move will be introduce the same reform measures on other 
banks. 
 
The other aphorism by Deng Xiaoping that “it doesn’t matter whether the cat is 
black or white, as long as it catches mice” aptly describes the current strategy of the entry 
of foreign banks as strategic investors. However, there is one difference here; the “cats” 
must be within the control of the government through majority stake-holding. Whether 
such strategy introduced in 2002 will work itself out has yet to be seen.  
 
In addition to the guides from the three aphorisms, the other noticeable strategy is 
the use of external pressure for accelerating reform process. The external pressure arise 
from foreign bank participation with no geographic, business and currency restrictions,   16
the introduction of foreign strategic investors, and the liberalization of capital account 
with the introduction of QFII and QDII. The advantage of such approach is that it 
prepares China’s financial system to be well integrated with the international financial 
system. Secondly, it forces domestic banks to conform with international standards and 
practices in terms of corporate governance, risk management and competitive practices. 
Finally, the soundness of the financial sector through this reform measure will help China 
to withstand external shocks in the era of globalization. 
 
 
3.1   Bank Restructuring and Regulatory Framework 
 
There is much improvement in bank performance after the bank restructuring 
since 1998. Non-performing loans of the Big Fours have been reduced significantly. 
Through capital injections, capital adequacy ratios for most banks were above 8% target. 
Despite all these efforts, there is no guarantee that the new loans extended may also end 
up as new NPLs. Podpiera,(2006) noted that after the bank restructuring, the lending 
behaviour of most banks remained almost unchanged. Apart from the restructuring of the 
Big Fours, nothing has been done for the small and medium banks. It is time to consider 
the consolidation of these city banks and regional banks through mergers and acquisitions 
to make these banks more efficient and able to withstand competitive pressure from 
foreign banks.  
 
In terms of institutional structure and regulatory framework, there has been 
significant changes and new direction in regulatory framework. By 2007, the regulatory 
framework for the financial sector in China comprises a host of regulatory and 
supervisory agencies. The more important ones are as follows: 
 
•  China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) 
•  China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC ) 
•  People’s Bank of China (PBOC) 
•  State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE)   17
•  China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) 
 
The division of labour in such a regulatory framework seems to be obvious. The main 
advantage is that such division of labour will lead to more focus in regulation and 
supervision with the objective of increasing efficiency. The major issue in such a 
framework is co-ordination problems, especially in enacting regulations and enforcement 
of corporate governance and risk management. The co-ordination problem will become 
less manageable as the distinction between banks and non-bank institutions become blur. 
More importantly, new financial products especially derivatives and structured products 
which covers the realms of both banking and securities business can hamper effective 
regulation and supervision from a diverse regulatory agencies. Secondly, the overlapping 
of authority among various regulatory agencies also will put a stumbling block to the spur 
of financial innovations and the provision of sophisticated financial services. As noted by 
Crooke (2006, p. 4): 
 
“…, the split in responsibilities between CBRC and CSRC has until recently hampered what has 
been approved to be sold in the structured products. Even though the CBRC’s 2004 rules on banks 
conducting derivatives transactions potentially allows products linked to things other than rates to 
be designed and offered, a clear distinction between banking and securities and futures business in 
China is rooted in law. As a result, some market players believe this has made the banking 
regulator less willing to approve structured products linked to equities, funds or commodities, for 
example.” 
 
Finally, the separation of regulatory agencies will also deter the integration of 
banking and capital markets and subsequently, the development of universal banking in 
China. The universalization of banking business is the inevitable trend amidst 
globalization and global competition. The deterrence to such development will not help 
modernize and upgrade the financial system in China. In a healthy regulatory 
environment, a regulatory framework should foster greater competition, corporate 
governance and risk management in the financial sector. 
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Another important issue that the banking reform has not dealt with thus far is the 
financing of the private sector. Only in recent years, do some efforts have been made to 
handle the issue of financing the private sector. 
 
Despite their declining contribution to GDP (40% as compared with 60% in 1980), large 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) sit at the pinnacle of financial access (Linton, 2006). 
Private firms, be it foreign or domestic, face substantial capital access barriers and must 
use a wide variety of informal means to obtain access to funding.  According to the All 
China Federation of Industry and Commerce reported by Zhou and Yang (2005), 58% of 
respondents regarded “financing by borrowing” as the biggest constraint facing by non-
SOEs. The survey conducted by the National Association of Industry and Commerce also 
reveals that 35% of private enterprises have never borrowed from banks. Ironically, the 
debt-ridden SOEs accounts for a big chunk of domestic bank loans (70%). Over 90% of 
private firms surveyed by OECD-China National Bureau of Statistics study (OECD, 2005) 
also confirms the inaccessibility of bank credit by the private sector. Small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs), which contribute more than half of GDP obtained only 10% of total 
bank loans (Linton, 2006). Consequently, SMEs have to depend on personal financing, 
company’s retained earnings or resorting to ‘shadow markets’ for funding. The ‘shadow 
markets’ are informal credit markets to include money lenders, enterprise networks, 
underground financial organizations as well as SOEs through receivable financing. 
This informal credit market provides as much as about 28% of the formal bank loans 
(Zhou and Yang, 2005). Between 1996 to 2001, informal credit accounted for three 
quarters of private sector credit (Tsai, 2006). Interest rates charged in such informal 
credit markets ranged from 12% to 200%, depending on the regions. 
 
Tsai (2006) gives four reasons why private enterprises are neglected in formal 
bank credit market. Firstly, the banks need to provide soft loans to SOEs as a mean to 
avoid mass unemployment, a potential cause for social instability. Secondly, policy or 
targeted lending by banks somehow crowd out private lending. Thirdly, loan officers are 
incapable of evaluating loan applications and credit worthiness of private enterprises.   19
Lastly, it would be ironic to provide loans to capitalists in a socialist state and that can be 
politically sensitive. 
 
To meet the demand for credit by private enterprises and to restrict the operation 
of the ‘shadow markets’, the government converted urban credit co-operatives into city 
commercial banks to increase efficiency and also to provide financial services to credit-
worthy private enterprises. In 2001, local credit guarantee companies were set up to serve 
private borrowers. In addition, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) 
issued “Guidelines on the Credit Business of Commercial Banks to Small Enterprises” in 
July 2005 to enhance the provision of financial services to private enterprises. Since then, 
various commercial banks establish special credit facilities to serve SMEs. At the end of 
2005, two microfinance institutions were set up in Pingyao in Shanxi Province to provide 
credit to private enterprises with interest rates higher than that of commercial banks. 
Despite all these efforts, Tsai (2006) convinced that informal credit market will continue 
to exist because of its peculiar locational features and also a way to evade taxes by no 
requirement for revealing accounts in such market. 
  
 
3.2   Ownership Restructuring and Foreign Strategic Investors 
 
The means of ownership restructuring in the China’s banking sector are 
corporatization through issues of initial public offerings (IPOs) and listing in the stock 
exchanges, as well as the introduction of foreign strategic investors since 2002. 
Privatization has not been the main channel of ownership restructuring. As such, majority 
stakeholders of the banking sector is still the government
7, as strategic investors as a 
group can only own up to 25% shares. 
 
Foreign financial institutions are willing to serve as strategic investors despite the fact 
that they can only be minority stakeholders. They are basically attracted by China’s rapid 
                                                 
7 From the Chinese government’s perspective, Ma(2006) argues that the issue of IPO and foreign equity 
participation provides an exit strategy for the state to recoup its equity investment in recapitalized banks.   20
economic growth, enormous, yet-untapped market potentials, and the opportunity to 
leverage local banks’ name recognition, customer bases and distribution networks. In 
particular, the yet-untapped market potentials include retail mortgages, credit cards, 
consumer lending, wealth management, fund management, and trustee services. The 
strategic alliances can augment foreign banks’ growth through their typically limited or 
non-existent local presence in China. The main concerns of foreign strategic investors 
(Hope and Hu 2006) are as follows: 
 
•  Poor corporate governance- no check and balances, few independent directors, no 
risk and audit committee, no transparency 
•  Minimum control and management – foreign ownership is restricted to 25%- may 
allow to have control over certain niches or line of business which they have 
expertise. 
•  Inadequate law and regulation – uncertainty and need more improvement 
•  Poor risk management- credit decisions are still driven by relationships, 
guarantees, and reliable collateral (buildings and land-use rights). Use of cash 
flow analysis is constrained by unreliability of accounts of enterprises. Corrupt 
practices and frauds are common.- Internal controls to curb operational risks is 
limited. 
 
Long-standing problems such as above make foreign investors cautious and thereby 
hamper business cooperation. As the strategic investors have only minority stakes, they 
might find it hard to exert influence over management (Lung and Fineman 2005). 
Secondly, shareholding restrictions will also limit foreign investors’ influence over 
medium-sized and small banks. Despite all these concerns, the Chinese government is 
more than willing “to mitigate some of these potential obstacles, in particular by 
establishing a legal system that supports banks more effectively, by limiting official 
intervention in the operations of the banks, and by ceding more voice to foreign strategic 
investors in the operations of the banks, …” (Hope and Hu, 2006). Foreign strategic 
investment has the potential to be very effective way to improve China’s banking 
system.”   21
 
Hansakul (2006) is equally optimistic about the participation of foreign strategic 
investors in China. He notes that penetrating the consumer banking market and the 
higher-margin SME sector will require more local networks and know-how which the 
foreign strategic investors are lacking. In this respect, the strategic partnership between 
foreign banks and Chinese banks is a logical step. While foreign banks can access to 
wider distribution channels and customer networks, Chinese banks with the help of 
strategic investors will be able to improve on credit and risk management, product 
innovations and IT system. In particular, having a foreign partner on board is expected to 
help Chinese banks to behave in accordance to a more commercially-driven, profit-
oriented business culture. 
  
 
3.3   Foreign Bank Participation and Capital Account Liberalization 
 
One of the main concerns about foreign bank entry into China is that domestic 
depositors will divert their deposits away from domestic banks. Clearly, foreign banks are 
better managed while domestic banks are not. Secondly, domestic banks are still saddled 
with huge amount of NPLs. However, such exodus of bank customers is not likely to 
happen (Hansakul, December 2006) even though foreign banks are able to offer all types 
of RMB businesses to all types of customers in China (WTO requirements by December 
2006). There are several reasons for this. Firstly, branch expansion of foreign banks will 
not be easy. There are red tapes to apply for branch licenses. For instance, foreign banks 
are required to have a representative office for three years before they can open a branch. 
In addition, the capital requirements for branching are equally prohibitive and high by 
international standards. In this respect, CBRC has taken steps to ease foreign bank 
applications for geographic expansion under a new banking regulations announced on 
November 15, 2006, ahead of the compliance date of 11
th December 2006. Still, it will 
take a long time for foreign banks to expand their branch networks in China. In the near 
term, with a lack of branch network, foreign banks are comparatively at a disadvantage in 
conducting RMB business, especially in consumer banking. Secondly, domestic banks   22
with its vast branch network have already established close relationship with local clients 
and it may be difficult for foreign banks to establish such relationships within a short 
period of time. Finally, Chinese banks have improved their performance considerably 
over the years and have expanded their business successfully that foreign banks may find 
difficulty to compete on level-playing field. However, there is still ample opportunities 
for them to focus on current business areas such as loan syndication for large projects, 
investment banking, treasury products and wealth management. These are the areas 
where they can complement what is lacking in domestic banks. Moreover, the Chinese 
market is huge and the saturation level has yet to be reached. 
 
China has been accused by the United States that it deliberately undervalues its 
currency to promote its exports, resulting in a huge trade surplus and accumulation of 
foreign exchange reserves for China (US-China ESRC, 2005). Various options have been 
put forward to address the issue for China to consider. One option is for China to adopt a 
flexible exchange with free capital flows which China rejects outright. China’s argument 
is that its financial system is still in its fragile stage and not able to withstand any external 
shocks. The other option is to adopt a flexible exchange rate system before its current 
account liberalization (Prasad, Rumbaugh and Wang, 2005). However, China is adopting 
a different option; liberalizing selectively its capital account first before the adoption of a 
more flexible exchange rate. The limited capital account liberalization takes the form of 
QFII and QDII. The two schemes in a sense establish a two-way channel for capital to 
flow in and out of China via institutional investors (Hang Seng, September 2006). They 
will encourage currency trading and represent a real step toward convertibility of RMB in 
capital account items. 
 
The two schemes are also strategically important in the sense that they help 
promote the integration of China’s domestic capital markets with the international capital 
market. The QFII scheme allows foreign financial institutions to penetrate into Chinese 
capital market, thereby exerting pressure for listed firms to abide international practice of 
proper corporate governance and risk management. Similarly, the QDII scheme will 
allow domestic financial institutions to diversify their portfolios and gain access high-  23
yielding investments overseas. However, there is foreign exchange risk in these 
transactions and financial market in China currently is not sophisticated enough to 
provide investors hedging facilities. Nevertheless, the exposure to foreign competition 
through the two schemes, and together with the WTO accession will provide a training 
ground for domestic banks and their clients to deal with external shocks, especially 
exchange rate fluctuation.   
 
Through the two schemes, domestic and foreign banks can forge alliances and 
cooperation in banking business. For instance, domestic QDII institutions are granted 
each with a larger foreign exchange conversion limit of US$2.5 billion while that of 
foreign bank is only US$ 500 million. At the same time, domestic banks with a wider 
branch networks and distribution are weak in terms of skills in internal control, marketing, 
investing and risk management in the global markets. Foreign banks, on the other hand 
are better positioned in these areas. Foreign banks also have vast experience in the 
business of custodianship and the QDII scheme grants these foreign banks the 
opportunity to act as custodians. In this respect, both domestic and foreign banks can 
work together for their respective mutual benefits. Such co-operation will also enhance 




3.4   Macroeconomic implications 
 
As noted by Mundell (1963) and Krugman (1979), a country cannot achieve the 
three objectives of exchange rate stability, monetary policy independence and free capital 
flows simultaneously. It can only achieve one or two of these objectives but has to be at 
the expense of the third objective. This is the concept of “Impossible Trinity” or 
“Macroeconomic Trilemma.” In the case of China, it values more a stable exchange rate 
environment and it prepares to forgo monetary policy independence and free capital 
flows. This is difficult to understand as China is adopting an export-led strategy in its 
economic development. The strategy also hinges on the inflow of foreign direct   24
investment. Stable exchange rate is therefore crucial to the success of such strategy which 
depends largely on international trade and investment. Secondly, RMB is not a 
convertible currency and therefore, thinly traded in the foreign exchange market. 
Consequently, any shocks in the foreign exchange market will lead to high volatility of 
RMB which in turn will affect trade and investment adversely. Secondly, monetary 
policy independence is meaningless to China as its financial and goods markets are very 
fragmented. Any changes in monetary aggregates and interest rates will have 
insignificant effect on the economy. Finally, free capital flows, in particular short-term 
capital flows can turn into speculative flows that would easily lead to currency crisis, 
banking collapse and stock market crashes. In this respect, China adopts non-
convertibility of RMB for capital and financial transactions. With the imposition of this 
exchange control, China, at least can be selective in the type of capital flows, as noted in 
the QFII and QDII schemes. 
 
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
 
If financial sector reform, in particular the banking reform is successful, then 
China can readily change its exchange rate regime to a more flexible one. Such a change 
is desirable considering the fact that the export-led strategy may be faded away as the 
economy is becoming more developed and domestic demand will have a greater impact 
on economic growth. China has, indeed, expressed its desire to move away from the 
export-led strategy towards domestic demand management (Che Lo, 2007). Monetary 
policy will play an increasingly more important role in this kind of macroeconomic 
management. In particular, if financial sector reform can further remove the existing 
structural segmentation between banking and securities sector, monetary policy will have 
a more pervasive in its impact. Equally important is the interest rate liberalization that 
allows market forces to work in the domestic money and capital markets. The capital 
account liberalization through the introduction of QFII and QDII schemes, likewise, will 
encourage active RMB trading, paving the way for the deepening of foreign exchange 
market in China.  
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China has made a significant inroad in accelerating the pace of QDII since its 
inception in 2006. One of the key objectives of QDII is to engineer a rapid capital 
outflows as RMB is under severe pressure to appreciate. At the same time current 
account surplus and capital inflows have led to the rapid monetary expansion which in 
turn, contributes to the overheating of the Chinese economy. China’s foreign exchange 
reserves is the largest in the world and has well exceeded US$ 1 trillion as at end of 2006. 
However, China may not be able to achieve the intended capital outflows  for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, capital outflows may not easily come by because domestic stock 
markets are too attractive for local investors. Investment abroad will incur high 
opportunity costs. Secondly, CBRC has signed MOU only with Hong Kong. Investment 
in Hong Kong capital market through QDII is unlikely to be attractive to Chinese 
residents as Hong Kong dollar (which is pegged to US dollar) is depreciating against 
RMB. Thirdly, with such exchange risk, China’s financial market is still not able to 
provide investors hedging facilities for exchange risk. However, in the longer term, QDII 
may be able to serve as a channel for exchange rate and capital flow management. 
 
In short, banking soundness with well-developed financial market is the basic 
foundation for macroeconomic management and also a key element in maintaining 
macroeconomic stability. 
 
4. Concluding  Remarks 
 
After the institutional reform to achieve a multi-tier banking system in the 1990s, 
China then moves on to address the more serious problems of NPLs and low 
capitalization. The low capitalization problem is much easier to resolve as China has a 
huge amount of foreign exchange reserves. The NPLs problem is much more complex 
and intricate as the problem involves a series of issues relating to reforms of state-owned 
enterprises as well as government finances. Such a typical case of “Asian Governance 
Triangle” requires not only political determination but also a change of banking business 
culture. Efforts have been made to increase competition, adherence to corporate 
governance and a shift towards commercially-driven banking business culture through   26
corporatization of state-owned banks, introduction of foreign strategic investors, 
accession to WTO and the implementation of QDII and QFII schemes. Further efforts are 
still needed to be done, especially in the area of corporate governance and risk 
management in a healthy regulatory framework.. 
 
China has made significant inroad in the globalization of banking operations but 
universalization of financial sector is still a long way to go. This is due in part to its 
compartmentalization in its regulatory framework. A more coordinated framework with 
PBOC as the supreme authority at its apex will be most welcome as PBOC is not only 
responsible for the implantation of monetary and exchange rate policy but also involves 
in the development of the financial sector. To withstand global competition and external 
shocks, city commercial banks and joint-stock commercial banks require immediate 
consolidation through mergers and acquisitions. Only with a strong foundation in the 
banking system, will China be ready to shift its exchange rate regime towards a more 
flexible one. 




Bekier, M. M., R. Huang and C. P. Wilson, “How to Fix China’s Banking System,” 
McKinsey Quarterly, No. 1, 2005. 
 
Boyreau-Debray and Shang-Jin Wei, (Mar 2005), “Pitfalls of a State-dominated Financial 
System: the Case of China,” NBER Working Paper No. 11214. 
 
Brean, Dornald, J.S. (Mar 2007), Banking Reform in China: What It Means for the World, 
Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada: Canada in Asia Publications Series. 
 
Casu, Barbara, C. Girardone and P. Molyneux, (2006), Introduction to Banking, Harlow: 
Prentice Hall and Financial Times. 
 




Chiu, Becky and M. K. Lewis, (2006), “Financial Sector Reform,” Reforming China’s 
State-owned Enterprises and Banks, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, p 186-224. 
 
Chu, Charlene, L. Lin, K. Lin and D. Marshall, (May 2006), “China: Stock of Banking 
System NPLs,” FitchRatings: Special Report. 
 
Crooke, Andrew (2006), “Evolution of Structure products in China,” 
http://www.pacificprospect.com/sp_china_2006/?page=evolution 
 
Dean, J.W. (2001) ‘Why Financial Crisis May Come to China but not to Taiwan’, in Anis 
Chowdhury and Iyanatul Islam (eds), Beyond the Asian Crisis – Pathways to 
Sustainable Growth, Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
Farrel, Diana and S. Lund, (May 2006), “Putting China’s Capital to Work,” McKinsey 
Global Institute. 
 
Ferri, Giovanni, (September 2005), “Banking in the People’s Republic of China: Are 
New tigers Supplanting Old Mmmoths?” ADB Institute Discussion Paper No. 35. 
 
Garcia-Herrero, A., Gavila, S., Santabarbara, D. (2005) ‘China’s Banking Reform: An 
assessment of its evolution and possible impact’, Documento Ocasional No. 0502, 
Banco de Espania. 
 
Hansakul, Syetam, (Dec 2006), “China’s Banking Sector: Ripe for the Next Stage?” 
Deutsche Bank Research Current Issues. 
 
Hansakul, Syetam, (Jan. 2004), “China’s Financial Sector: Institutional Framework and 
Main challenges,” Deutsche Bank Research China Special.   28
 
Hang Seng Bank, (Sep.2006), ”QDII – A Catalyst for China’s New Financial 
Landscape,” Hang Seng Economic Monthly. 
 
Hang Seng Bank, (Feb/Mar 2007), “Deepening Banking Reform on the Mainland,” Hang 
Seng Economic Monthly. 
 
Hope, Nicholas and Fred Hu, (April 2006), “Reforming China’s Banking System: How 
Much Can Foreign Strategic Investment Help?” Standard Center for International 
Development Working Paper No. 276 
 
Huang, Y. (2002), “Is Meltdown of the Chinese Banks Inevitable?” China Economic 
Review 13: 382-387. 
 
Krugman, P. (1979), “A Model of Balance of Payments Crises,” Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking, 1979 (11).  
 
Lin, Yifu, Justin, (2001), “WTO Accession and Financial Reform in China,” Cato 
Journal, Vol. 21, No. 1, p. 13-18. 
 
Linton, K. C. (December 2006), “Access to Capital in China: Competitive Conditions for 
Foreign and Domestic firms,” United States International Trade Commission 
Journal of International Commerce and Economics, p. 1-21. 
 
Lung, Richard and D. Fineman, (July 2005), “Foreign Banks’ New China Strategy,” 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Asia Focus. 
 
Ma, G. N. (2006), “Who Pays China’s Bank Restructuring Bill?” CEPII Working Paper 
No. 2006-4 
 
Mundell, R. (1963), “Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy under Fixed and Flexible 
Exchange Rates,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 1963 (4). 
 
Ng, Beoy Kui and A. Thorud, (2007), “China’s ‘Asian Governance Triangle’ and Its 
Evolution: A Critical Perspective,” Asian Culture No. 31: 72-94. 
 
OECD, (2005), “Economic Survey of China, 2005” OECD Observer, September 2005. 
 
Podpiera, Richard, (2006), “Progress in China’s Banking Sector Reform: Has bank 
Behavior Changed?” IMF Working Paper, WP/06/71. 
 
Prasad, Eswar, T. Rumbaugh, and Q. Wang, (2005), “Putting the Cart Before the Horse? 
Capital Account Liberalization and Exchange Rate Flexibility,” IMF Policy 
Discussion Paper, PDP/05/1 
   29
Tsai, K. S. (August 2006), “Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission on China’s Financial System,” www.uscc.gov 
 
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (ESRC), (May 2005), “The China 
Currency Exchange Rate Problem: Facts and Policy Options,” 
http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2005/05_05_09currency_exchange_rate.pdf 
 
Zhou Xiaojie and Yang, Jian. (2005), “Shadow Market,” CFO Asia, July/August 2005. 
http://cfoasia.com 
   30
 




Source: Garcia-Herrero, A., Gavila, S., Santabarbara, D. (2005) 
 
   31
Table 1: Financial Support Measures 
 
















Big four state-owned banks 
Bank of China (BOC) 
China Construction Bank (CCB) 
Bank of Communications (BOCOM) 
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) 











Big four state-owned banks and China 
Development Bank (CDB) 
BOC, CCB and BOCOM 
ICBC 
Total 305  









Share of banks 
loans 
Outstanding 









Orient Asset Management   BoC  32.3  20.4  12.9  39.9  2.9  22.8 
Great Wall Asset Management  ABC 41.8  24.6  25.8 61.8 2.7  10.4 
Cinda Asset Management  CCB  45.0 21.7  18.56  41.2 6.2  33.6 
Huarong Asset Management  ICBC 49.2  17.9  25.9 52.6 5.1  19.9 
Total    168.3 20.7  83.2  49.4  16.9  20.6 
Note: in USD billions at March-2005 
Source: PBoC, CRBC, Annual reports, BIS working paper No. 115 
Adapted from Garcia-Herrero
 et al, 2005 
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Table 3: Announced Foreign Direct Investment in Chinese Banks 
 
Year  Target Banks  Strategic Investors  Equity 
Investment (%) 
2006  Ningbo City Commercial Bank  OCBC  12.2
2006 ICBC  Goldman  Sachs-led  consortium  10.0
2005  Tianjin City Commercial Bank  Australia and New Zealand Bank  20.0
2005 BOC  RBS/Temasek/UBS/ADB  16.84
2005 CCB  BOA/  Temasek  14.1
2005  Bank of Communication  HSBC  19.9
2005  Bohai Bank  Standard Chartered Bank  19.9
2005  Huaxia Joint Stock Bank  Deutsche Bank/ Pangaea  20.9
2005  Hangzhou City Bank  Commonwealth Bank of Australia  19.9
2005  Bank of Beijing  ING/IFC  24.9
2004  Bank of Jinan  Commonwealth Bank of Australia  11.0
2004  Xian City Commercial Bank  IFC/ Bank of Nova Scotia  5.0
2004  Shenzhen Development Bank  Newbrigde Capital  17.9
2004  Minsheng Bank  IFC/ Temasek  6.2
2004  Industrial Bank  Hang Seng Bank/ IFC/ GIC  24.9
2002  Shanghai Pudong Development Bank  Citigroup  5.0
2002  Nanjing City Commercial Bank  IFC  15.0
2002 China  Everbright  Bank  IFC  4.9
2002  Bank of Shanghai  IFC/HSBC/HK Shanghai Com Bank  13.0
 
Source: Table 7 of Ng & Thorud (2007), adapted from Ma, 2006. 
 
 
Table 4: China’s Sources of Finance (Percentage Share, %) 
 
  2001  2002 2003 2004 2005 
Bank loans  75.9 80.2 85.1 82.9  78.1
Government bonds  15.7 14.4 10.0 10.8  9.5
Corporate bonds  0.9 1.4 1.0 1.1  6.4
Equity 7.6 4.0 3.9 5.2  6.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0
Source: Peoples’ Bank of China 
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Table 5: Overview of Curb Market Activities in China 
 





Rotating credit associations 
(in some areas) 
 
Pawn shops 
















Pawn shops (in some areas) 
Professional brokers and 
money lenders (loan sharks) 
 
Private money houses 
 
Rotating credit associations 





Diversion of bank loans via 
state unit 
1.  A privately owned enterprise is registered as a collective enterprise and therefore 
‘wearing a red hat” which symbolizes communism. A hang-on enterprise is a 
privately-owned enterprise registered as a subsidiary of SOEs. These two 
deceptive ways of registration is to ensure the access of bank credit. 




Figure 2: Impossible Trinity 
 














 Free  capital  flows     Monetary  policy  independence 